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Making Peace with War:  
Adaptation and the Soviet Political 
Economy in the Blockade of Leningrad
Adaptation and the Soviet Political Economy
While one of the main criticisms of the Soviet economy 
was that it was inherently inefficient, another was that rigid 
adherence to the Plan structure and lack of accountability 
constrained innovation and the capacity to adapt to shifting 
economic circumstances within and outside the country. 
Policy shifts were the result of Kremlin politics to address 
those inefficiencies for political ends: e. g. Stalin’s changes in 
economic goals between the first and second Five-Year Plans, 
Aleksei Kosygin’s attempt to introduce some decision-making 
flexibility (Liberman reforms), and Mikhail Gorbachev’s pe-
restroika. The story after NEP was that innovations were 
grounded in political struggles, or were marginal changes 
that did not address contradictions within the Soviet political 
economy1. Maintaining the visible relevance of Bolshevism — 
correctness of the Communist Party and its leadership, cen-
trality of “Soviet” identity, absence of private ownership of the 
means of production, planned exchange — was core to Soviet 
political DNA. 
What of survival in war? What were roots, enablers, and 
constraints on adaptation in practices and logics of Soviet 
economic institutions? If there was a moment when regime 
elites and average cadres should have been open to some de-
gree of “opening” Soviet institutions and turning to pragmatic 
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such the event. If the regime’s ultimate goal was holding on to power, the extreme 
nature of the Blockade — from the imminent threat of German storming the city, to 
the destruction from shells and bombs, to the starvation that gripped the city (and 
opportunism in illegal food theft and resale that emerged)  — should have moved 
elites and officials to focus on defending that core logic (maintaining power) and 
being prepared to alter other institutions and practices to support that goal. While 
Stalin grew impatient with Andrei Zhdanov’s incapacity to act forcefully and proac-
tively2, civilians began to take matters into their own hands: for example, letters to 
Zhdanov and others at the top to beg for food and sometimes to warn the elite of 
corruption or speculation; or active searches for extra food, which could include 
bartering with soldiers (e.  g. tobacco for food), collecting vegetables left in fields 
near Leningrad, or participating in a black market of stolen food or stealing food 
themselves in the most desperate circumstances3.
In this article we look at adaptation in 1942, when it was clear that the Blockade 
was not going to end any time soon and the consequences of pre-war institutions, 
policies, and practices were not quite up to the task of mass survival and mobili-
zation, or had contributed (via sins of omission or commission) to mass death. We 
focus on policy adaptations related to supply and distribution of food. We also focus 
on the formal policies themselves, leaving the shadow economy and policy deliber-
ations as separate (if intimately related) subjects for another time. Adaptation has 
many facets, such as causation (what compels, facilitates, and hinders), trajectory, 
and degree of adaptation. We also focus on trajectory and degree: how far did ad-
aptations move from initial policies, and in what manner? For the moment, we infer 
and imply relations and mechanisms of causation nudging policies and practices of 
authority. This means several issues arise: 1) In what manner and to what degree did 
preexisting knowledge, habits, and practices of command facilitate and constrain the 
perceptions and appreciation of risks, and the capacity to imagine and implement 
responses and adaptations? 2) How did contingencies — from military events, to de-
cisions from Moscow, to city-level relations and decisions and negotiations — affect 
the form, trajectory, and degree of adaptation?
The elite in Smolny were unprepared for anything like the Blockade. Some of 
this could be forgiven, as foreseeing the Blockade itself would require the foresight 
of a deity. Yet in other ways, Zhdanov et al. were guilty of sins of omission and com-
mission. We should not be hostage to the belief that Zhdanov was all-powerful. While 
he might not have learned important lessons from the Winter War4, in other ways his 
hands were tied by institutional characteristics of the command economy. Domestic 
trade played an enormous role in the movement of capital in the Soviet command 
economy, generating the lion’s share of income to budgets and providing cash for 
local banks for paying salaries to workers and engineers. Any serious limitations 
on trade used to defend Leningrad’s stocks of resources (including food) would 
diminish cash flows into the budget and force the state to print more money. One 
lesson learned from the Winter War was a decree on June 22, 1941, by the Narkomat 
of Finance, limiting cash withdrawals from savings accounts to 200 rubles per month; 
further, interest payments on state bonds were stopped5. Further reconstruction of 
the political economy of production and provision, however, required much fore-
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sight and confronting practices and interests ingrained by a decade of the Stalinist 
command economy. Persistence of pre-war practices continued in other institutional 
spheres. For example, the NKVD continued to seek “traitors” and fifth columns where 
there might have been few threats — yet food security became equally or more im-
portant, given the degree of opportunistic theft and speculative resale of food from 
the state’s storage depots6.
We can add to this that suboptimal policies and policy failures left Leningrad 
with the worst possible situation on September 8, 1941: too many people and too 
few resources inside the blockade ring. Calling initial civilian evacuations “bungled” 
would understate how badly organized the entire endeavor was. The first attempt 
to evacuate children was ineptly run, leading some civilians to distrust further state 
attempts. As well, so long as civilians were unaware of the true nature of the German 
advance and believed in pre-war propaganda — the Red Army would quickly take any 
fight to enemy soil — they had incentives to remain, in particular not losing jobs and 
living accommodations in the Soviet Union’s second city. Zhdanov did not request 
permission from Stalin to make Leningrad a “besieged city” (gorod na osadnom 
polozhenii), which would have given the authorities the rights to compel mass ci-
vilian evacuation. This left over 2,5 million civilians in the city and its surroundings, 
to which we can add refugees streaming from western territories. In contrast to too 
many people, there was too little food in reserve. Zhdanov waited as long as he 
could legally to implement rations (July 18, 1941), and even then permitted ration 
levels often little different from Leningraders’ usual pre-war diets. Fuel was also not 
sufficiently in reserve: energy resources, especially coal, were practically depleted 
by mid-August, since railroads exclusively transported troops and munitions7, Finally, 
city finances were further strained by the creation of the narodnoe opolchenie in July 
1941 — Moscow would not make decisions on financing these units until August 14, 
leaving regional authorities to foot the bill and distract resources and attention from 
other wartime preparation8.
In these circumstances, policies had to be innovative, while not risking Stalin’s 
suspicion or raising civilian expectations for future reforms, especially devolution 
of autonomy. Smolny’s challenge was navigating between the Scylla of toeing a 
Stalinist line, and the Charybdis of meeting real challenges of Blockade and war. 
We argue that the experience of the first deadly winter forced the elite to take ad-
aptation seriously, in a way that maintained state and Party power and hegemony of 
Bolshevism, while also taking practical, realistic steps to improve effectiveness of 
civilian provision. Given enough pressure, elites revealed that they could learn, just 
as civilians were forced to learn to cope with starvation — and they learned how to 
maintain practical control while ceding some symbolic control. A NEP. 2, in which the 
state controlled the commanding heights but allowed some degree of autonomy, 
was in the making.
Organizational Innovations: Streamlined Economic Control
Policies for feeding civilians in the first six months of the Blockade had a one-
size-fits-all logic. The only real policy of import early on was rationing  — even if 
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introduced a month into the war and enforced in a slipshod fashion. The only real 
variation in the ration system was four formal, public categories (with workers and 
engineers important to military production in the highest category), and all Len-
ingraders were placed in one of the four9. In the course of the first months of the 
Blockade, the authorities persisted with the strategy of increasing centralized control 
over the distribution of food: eventually, food was available only through stores or a 
decreasing number of canteens and cafeterias, and then only in strict accordance 
with exchanging the proper value of ration coupons. This strict control, the authori-
ties seemed to think, would allow them to optimize the distribution of food not only 
to civilians generally but also in varying proportions depending on the military utility 
of different groups of civilians. Centralized control of food also kept this key resource 
of social control in the hands of the authorities — in theory.
Organizational change was possible that could maintain the Bolshevik mo-
nopoly on power. Smolny had the example in Moscow and some regions of restruc-
turing lines of authority. Not long after the Wehrmacht invaded, lines of authority 
were streamlined. The GKO (Gosudarstvennyi komitet oborony, State Defense 
Committee) in Moscow was the pinnacle of power, and authority was centralized in 
GorKO (Gorodskoi komitet oborony, city committee for defense) in some localities10. 
Leningrad’s own Military Council was an initial example of adaptation that maintained 
(and even improved) centralization of power. On July 24, 1941, the authorities cre-
ated the Commission on Defensive Work around Leningrad (Komissiia po stroitel’stvu 
ukreplennoi polosy vokrug Leningrada), which on August 20  became the Defense 
Council (Soviet oborony). Stalin demanded changes in its membership, and on Au-
gust 30  the Military Council of the Leningrad Front (Voennyi sovet leningradskogo 
fronta) was finalized11. Yet centralizing authority over civilian and military affairs did 
not mean further innovations were inevitable or would be effective. More thorough 
changes in institutional structures of food provision, for example, was a potentially 
more radical undertaking that could affect the relative balance of power between 
various state organizations, and between the state and civilians. Further innovations 
would require a powerful incentive — such as the wave of mass death that overtook 
Leningrad. Yet it seemed that was enough; come 1942, Smolny began to rethink 
organizational structures and practices, perhaps before civilians themselves took 
desperate innovative action to save their lives.
Distributing Food. The Military Council was not entirely docile in the second 
year of the Blockade. Even if new policies and innovations continued to follow a 
basic Bolshevik script of centralized, hierarchical control, new feeding policies 
augmented the ration system or aimed to improve its effectiveness, and there was 
some degree of delegating responsibility for obtaining and distributing food. One of 
the most important institutional adaptations came once starvation was well under 
way: the creation of the Food Commission of the Military Council of the Leningrad 
Front12. On January 11, 1942, Sovnarkom sent a shipment of food to Leningrad for 
distribution to soldiers at the Leningrad Front and to besieged civilians. Aware of the 
desperate food situation in the city, Leningrad’s Military Council stipulated the cre-
ation of the Food Commission as a subgroup responsible for strict oversight of food 
distribution, from adjusting ration levels to allotting food to specific organizations to 
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approving one-time packages of additional food to individuals. Formal members of 
the Food Commission were Aleksei Kuznetsov (Zhdanov’s right-hand man and the 
most active leader), Pеtr Popkov (chair of the Leningrad Ispolkom, city council), Pеtr 
Lazutin (Party secretary for food), and sometimes Iakov Kapustin (Party secretary 
for industry). Nikolai Solov’ev, chair of the Leningrad oblast’ ispolkom, was initially 
on the Food Commission, but we found little evidence of his active participation 
in decision-making. Zhdanov was not formally on the Food Commission, but as 
the most important member de facto of the Military Council, important questions 
were referred to him. Judging from hand-written comments on these requests, 
Kuznetsov’s suggestions also carried weight. (In contrast, Kapustin’s and Popkov’s 
recommendations usually did not go far if their judgment differed from Kuznetsov’s 
or Zhdanov’s.) Ivan Andreenko implemented Food Commission directives but did 
not participate in decision-making. The first meeting was on January 15, 1942, and 
most members met thereafter on an as-needs basis: more often in winter and spring 
1942 when lobbying was at its most intense, less often later.
Centralizing decision-making over food in the Food Commission promised to 
solve two vexing and related organizational issues. The first was that different ac-
tors within the state and Party — e. g. Glavrestoran (city organization for restaurants 
and canteens), Raipishchetorg (district organizations for food distribution), and the 
like  — might work at cross-purposes, and various organizations and enterprises 
were lobbying Smolny for extra food. With decision-making centralized in the Food 
Commission, Leningrad’s leaders could streamline important decisions on who 
received what food, such that Andreenko, Lazutin, and others with authority over 
the distribution of food were all on the same page, while also addressing desperate 
lobbying from various directions13. Further, this also streamlined lobbying: directors 
of research institutes, enterprises, and libraries, and even deputy heads of regional 
NKVD or military units, who thought they needed more food, could initiate an ap-
peal to the Food Commission rather than going through more convoluted channels. 
(Approximately one fourth of appeals were from individuals, and the rest were from 
organizations, from our rough estimate based on appeals available in archives.) This 
said, whether the Food Commission significantly improved the effectiveness of food 
distribution and civilian survival is difficult to ascertain. At the very least, decisions 
about targeted distribution of food were more orderly, even if implementing those 
decisions still faced such institutional challenges as insider opportunism (e. g. theft 
and speculative resale of food). 
While the Food Commission was an important innovation that seemed to im-
prove decision-making efficiency vis-à-vis food, other organizational changes were 
more problematic, in part because they involved more working parts. Some changes 
entailed organizational mergers, such that changes were more a matter of lines of 
command than real procedures for providing civilians with food. An early and im-
portant innovation, suggested by ordinary people, was to “attach” civilians to their 
nearest bread stores. This gave civilians some certainty that there was a place where 
they had rights to obtain food, and by making the civilian search for food less chaotic 
and rationalizing it, this also made it possible to get rations without standing in long 
queues as long as before this reform. Additionally, in May 1942, the city Ispolkom 
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proposed closing consolidating food stores to streamline provision. Lenkhlebtorg 
(the state organization for selling bread) was liquidated, and its resources were 
transferred to Raipishchetorg (the broader food trade organization)14. Another, and 
potentially more significant, organizational adaptation was the creation of “Depart-
ments for worker provision” (ORS, Otdel rabochego snabzheniia). This was not a 
new policy, as ORS existed in the 1930s; but in the Blockade, Smolny considered 
expanding the ORS network, and this involved further decentralization. The first wave 
of introducing ORSy came in late 1941, and the change was introduced to more large 
enterprises by June 1942. One potential effect of using the ORS system was that 
workers would not have to search for food throughout the city or spend time pre-
paring it; ORS made it possible for workers to spend more time on the job. This also 
potentially increased worker dependency on the state for supplying food. This said, 
the real contribution of ORS to improving food provision was difficult to measure, 
and supplying workers with food remained incredibly difficult15. However, the ORS 
innovation did point to another direction of organizational adaptation: new structures 
or policies introduced from above, but allowing some degree of decentralization in 
actual functioning. Unable to count on a significant increase in the amount of food 
brought into the city, the authorities turned to rationalizing the use of what they had 
and what little could come in across frozen Ladoga. One combination of hierarchy 
with some decentralization was the statsionar, a special site where civilians at the 
highest risk of death were provided with extra food and warmer surroundings, as 
well as a modicum of medical attention. Often the stay was for ten days, although 
this could vary with staff decisions at specific sites and was not always consistent16. 
While this innovation helped some survive, it was a relatively conservative innovation. 
Access was not universal, and food provision was only a slight improvement over 
usual rations. 
As a matter of course, opening a statsionar required permission or orders from 
Party and state officials. Once that permission was given, enterprise managers and 
workers had some responsibility preparing space for a statsionar — and sometimes 
they had to fulfill other responsibilities as well. A. S. Belov and E. P. Petrov, workers 
at the Proletarskii factory, wrote about organizing a statsionar at their enterprise 
at the behest of Party and state decrees “to preserve cadres”. Belov and Petrov, 
self-proclaimed “Old Bolsheviks”, were given the job of organizing and then running 
the statsionar in late January 1942. They received part of a hospital barracks that 
was in horrible shape — broken glass was everywhere and doors would not shut, for 
example — but after a week of working only with axes and shovels and sometimes 
even sleeping there to maximize effort, they had enough rooms in good enough 
order that a statsionar could function, in theory. To function, however, the statsionar 
needed food, and Belov and Petrov quickly learned they were responsible for this 
task as well. Not only did they have to go through the factory store to obtain the 
bread; they then had to use sleds to transport it from the relevant food depot to 
the statsionar. On February 1, they proudly published the first statsionar menu: an 
omelet and tea for breakfast; wine, beef broth, and kasha for lunch; and goulash and 
cocoa for dinner. The portions were meager — the omelet used only seven grams of 
powdered egg — but a statsionar patient received 400 grams of bread daily. Opening 
59J. K. Hass, N. A. Lomagin. Making Peace with War…
Новейшая история России. 2020. Т. 10, № 1
a statsionar was not without challenges. The assistant store manager did not know 
about the statsionar project, and so he did not recognize a memorandum from the 
trade department requesting food for the statsionar as valid. Belov and Petrov had to 
call the factory director, who eventually called the assistant managers and put things 
right. It then turned out that Belov and Petrov would need hard cash to obtain the 
wine. Belov and Petrov mentioned that there had been other bureaucratic obstacles, 
but that the factory director and Party cell chair usually managed to cut through the 
red tape. From February to May 1942, they claimed, the statsionar helped 274 men 
and 131 women survive17.
Not all openings of statsionary awaited word from above. Sofiia Glazomitskaia, 
Party secretary for the Rabochii textile factory, related a narrative in which her Party 
cell and her workers were both obedience to the authorities’ demands but also took 
initiative, sometimes ahead of the authorities. One such case was a factory stat-
sionar. In January 1942, the city Gorkom instructed Rabochii to set up a statsionar, 
but Glazomitskaia claimed that they already had an unofficial statsionar up and 
running: Rabochii workers had organized beds and linens in one unused room, and 
they contributed ration coupons to obtain food through normal stores to feed those 
comrades most in danger of dying from starvation. Glazomitskaia pre-empted the 
obvious question: how did one obtain food that was so scarce and when everyone 
was starving? She noted that until the statsionar was officially approved, Rabochii 
workers did in fact sacrifice some of their scarce food for the greater good. They 
also used some of materials normally used for production but at this moment un-
used — leather destined for belts and other such things — that could be turned into 
something edible18.
The statsionar was a temporary measure to address the most drastic cases of 
starvation as the wave of mass death was crashing over the city. Most sites were op-
erational only between January 1 and May 1, 1942. They were replaced by stolovye 
usilennogo pitaniia, “high-calorie diet canteens” that provided marginally higher 
rations and were organized in factories and enterprises and several orphanages. Yet 
this direction of organizational adaptation did not end with this change. Along with 
centralization and streamlining existing structures, the authorities experimented 
with greater precision in control and targeting food provision, in a way that would 
maintain control while optimizing civilian well-being. One innovation that promised 
to maintain centralized control and to improve effectiveness of feeding civilians was 
ratsionnoe pitanie, which changed procedures for feeding and using ration coupons. 
Ratsionnoe pitanie had the potential for two improvements in feeding civilians. First, 
before summer 1942, enterprise workers had various ration coupons corresponding 
to different types of food (bread, meat, sugar, etc.), and workers usually could eat 
only one time per day at the enterprise cafeteria, at lunch. Ration coupons not used 
in the cafeteria could be used in stores for the same kind of food. In the new system, 
ration coupons were specific for type and source of food: cafeteria coupons were 
good only for a specific cafeteria, and enterprise cafeterias offered three meals per 
day. This policy was tried experimentally in several enterprises in May 1942; by late 
June Smolny decreed it be employed across most Leningrad enterprises. Second, 
ratsionnoe pitanie, like ORS, potentially expanded control over workers by tying the 
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labor force to enterprises for nourishment: now they had to use rations at specified 
cafeterias, and did not have to search the city for food (and thus had one less ex-
cuse for not showing up to work). Given that many workers’ families had been or 
likely would be evacuated by late summer 1942, this freed workers to focus on labor. 
Further, in principle this policy meant Leningrad workers were eating similar meals 
at similar times, a standardization of movement and nourishment of bodies. Before, 
Leningraders might move between stores and cafeterias at various times — unless 
long lines dictated arriving early in the morning — and this could break any rhythms 
of labor and everyday life in the besieged city. Now there was a potentially more 
structured rhythm not only to eating but also to work and to survival — with the usual 
caveat that ratsionnoe pitanie was employed as intended.
Measured and targeted extra food might seem a marginal improvement, but in 
Blockade conditions this was a welcome improvement. One report to Zhdanov and 
Kuznetsov from April 1942 reported that, were this new policy to be operation by June 
15 as planned, ratsionnoe pitanie would add around 17 % more calories for the var-
ious ration categories. Workers on category I rations would receive 2127 calories per 
meal instead of the 1781 calories of normal rations. Service personnel (sluzhashchie) 
would receive 1589 calories instead of 129519. Unsurprisingly, this innovation in feed 
required organizational changes — in particular, the expansion of Lenglavrestoran. 
More cafeterias and canteens had to be opened for rationnoe pitanie to work, be-
cause this new policy would apply to 951  300  people  — practically the entire city 
population! At that moment, Lenglavrestoran had 1438 enterprise canteens and caf-
eterias with 140 000 seats and the capacity to prepare at best 1 856 000 meals per 
day — far too few meals, as the plan called for three meals if possible (even if dinner 
was relatively light). Not all of these were operational, apparently, and to meet the 
required plan Lenglavrestoran would have to get some of these working again — if 
possible, 260 more cafeterias would become operational, adding 780 000 meals per 
day20. However, Lenglavrestoran did not have the capacity to expand their network to 
this extent. There were not enough trained personnel, and so employees would have 
to be recruited and given crash-courses in preparing the special meals for this policy. 
One possibility was to recruit housewives who were at the moment unemployed or 
underemployed21.
Youth were also targeted for ratsionnoe pitanie in late 1942, given that they 
had received low rations thus far. In November 1942, the Party Gorkom directed 
Party leaders at lower-level bodies and enterprise directors to integrate youth up to 
16 years old into the ratsionnoe pitanie system. Many youth were working in various 
enterprise in the capacity of apprentices, and their salaries were miserly — around 
125  rubles per month. However, local rationnoe pitaniue could cost almost twice 
that. Parents could help sometimes, but orphans and youth with less well-off parents 
were at a serious disadvantage. Some less well-off youth would use ration coupons 
to obtain bread but only eat half of it; the other half they would sell at the rynok for 
extra money, perhaps to buy or repair clothes or shoes. Thus, local enterprise di-
rectors were requesting permission to give these youths extra wages. Other youths 
were using “advances” of their rations, i.e. trading in ration coupons for future days to 
obtain food today, which they might eat hurriedly and without setting aside reserves. 
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One suggestion to address this issue was to give youth special coupons that would 
not allow such advances22.
Sources of Food. These policy shifts sometimes could seem like a game of 
shifting responsibility for feeding civilians from one part of the bureaucracy (Raipish-
chetorg and Lenglavrestoran) to another (enterprises). Yet there was an innovative 
facet to this policy: enterprises gained not only obligations, but also rights and ben-
efits from distributing and even producing their own food23. In his April 1943 report 
about enterprise structure and the provision of food, I. G. Stozhilov noted that one 
problem in 1942 was that various food trusts (tresty) “took such a great burden on 
themselves and could not concretely get to every factory or even every shopfloor, 
as was demanded.” When the authorities told enterprise directors to do something, 
directors generally responded, “give us the chance.” The authorities responded by 
ordering enterprise directors to organize podsobnoe khoziaistvo — literally, “victory 
gardens” — at their factories24.
The authorities streamlined distribution of food, whether to improve general 
efficiency or to better target civilians: stantionary, ORS and stolovye usilennogo 
pitaniia, and so on. However, such policies had two shortcomings: they did not al-
ways address the quantity of food, and they did not address alternative channels for 
distributing food, especially shadow exchange. This does not mean the authorities 
were ignorant of the need to address food security. In fact, on the eve of war, the 
Eighteenth Party Congress adopted decisions for rapid development of local provi-
sion: popular consumption should increase by 150  percent, commensurate with a 
rise in wages and in volume of state an cooperative trade (from 126 billion rubles in 
1937, to 206 billion rubles in 1942); and state and cooperative retail trade networks 
should expand by 38 percent to improve trade. Additionally, in March 1939 the Eight-
eenth Party Congress adopted a special plan to build around Moscow and Leningrad 
a set of agricultural bases to provide vegetables, meat, and dairy products for those 
cities. The goal was “to use in full existing potentials to create a suburban zone of 
flourishing agriculture”25. Alas, these directives were nowhere near complete when 
war began. State consumer trade in Leningrad grew by only 0,4  percent, and old 
flaws of the trading system persisted: consumer demand and conditions for selling 
various goods were badly studied (if at all), and local resources were poorly used. 
In 1943, Leningrad authorities assessed the needs in vegetables and potatoes as 
350 kilos per person26. In fact, consumption of those products for 1938–1940 was 
substantially lower, and the city still had to buy food from other regions27. This did 
not auger well for war, even more for a blockade of the city.
Without having these formal, developed food bases, the authorities did the 
next best thing: create smaller food bases using whatever land was available. This 
ended up as an expansion of another pre-war policy, podsobnoe khoziaistvo (“ancil-
lary farms”, i. e. extended victory gardens). While podsobnoe khoziaistvo had been 
in use by some major enterprises before the war, to provide extra food for those 
organizations, two civilian academics proposed expanding this practice early into 
the Blockade. In November 1941, as mass hunger set in, V. A. Bryzgalov, a young 
professor of vegetable production at the Leningrad Institute of Agriculture, and 
I. S. Mekhanik, a senior agronomist for Lengorplan, sent Popkov a memorandum 
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proposing to use available free space in the city and existing sovkhozy (39 inside the 
Blockade ring) to grow vegetables28. Bryzgalov and Mekhanik argued that situation 
on the “food front” was looking bad for summer and autumn 1942, but the author-
ities could alleviate this by cultivating vegetables anywhere possible, and investing 
in pig and cattle farming inside the Blockade ring. They suggested the authorities, 
in that first winter, quickly take account of available land for growing, create a seed 
fund, prepare greenhouses, print appropriate brochures with necessary instructions 
for sowing and cultivation, organize labor for transportation and sowing, and then 
sow in the spring and summer29. To realize this project, Bryzgalov and Mekhanik 
suggested creating an agriculture department (sel’khozbiuro)30. They called for be-
ginning vegetable production in late autumn 1941, but due to the lack of energy for 
greenhouses, the project was postponed. (As an aside, in the 1970s and 1980s the 
Leningrad-based agricultural enterprise Leto was able to provide Leningraders with 
radish, potatoes, cucumbers, and tomatoes for the entire year  — so this was not 
unfeasible, regardless of Leningrad’s naturally short growing season.) 
In 1942, Smolny ordered enterprise directors to organize such gardens on 
industrial territories31, and then gave civilians seeds to plant crops any place they 
could till, such as the grounds in front of St. Isaac’s cathedral. Ultimately, podsobnoe 
khoziaistvo was not limited to enterprise property: civilians were given seeds and 
ordered to plant gardens in apartment courtyards or any other place that could be 
tilled. Civilians took up the task, although some had to cope with theft of carrots and 
cabbage32. The many parks and green space in Leningrad were originally designed 
for aesthetic reasons, but in 1942 they served a new purpose: that earth could be 
used to grow various vegetables that would feed the civilians and soldiers in the 
winter of 1942–1943. Open land not only in parks or courtyards, but also on factory 
grounds and in suburban space within the Blockade ring were fair game for planting 
as well. In 1942–1943, one can see the scale of private initiative supported by the 
authorities. Planting vegetables in many local parks was viewed by Smolny as a 
temporary and acceptable compromise. 
Victory gardens made a contribution to Leningrad’s food security for the 
second winter of the Blockade. According to an Ispolkom report, 2927 tons of po-
tatoes were harvested inside the Blockade ring for 1942, of which 1712 tons came 
from Victory gardens and only 1215  from sovkhozy inside the siege area. In fact, 
podsobnoe khoziaistvo had overfulfilled the planned target, while local state farms 
had not fulfilled even 50 percent of what was planned for them. A report from October 
27, 1943 revealed further results of podsobnoe khoziaistvo. In 1942, 1784 hectares 
were set aside for planting, and in 1943 this was increased to 3009 hectares33, which 
were administered by 25  sovkhozy and 633  smaller podsobnye khoziaistva34. In 
1942, 2927  tons of potatoes were harvested  — 1712  from podsobnoe khoziaistvo, 
versus 1215 from local sovkhozy. For 1943, this increased to 13 207 tons (podsobnoe 
khoziaistvo) and 4429  tons (sovkhozy)35. (If there was a lesson about the relative 
efficiency — or lack thereof — of the collective farm system, the authorities did not 
note it.) Between 1942 and 1943, the amount of land set aside for vegetables was 
reduced, with additional land given over to growing potatoes, because the latter pro-
vided more food per unit of land. In the “right” conditions, it seems, Soviet political 
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economy could recognize dictates of efficiency and respond appropriately36. Impor-
tantly, while some podsobnoe khoziaistvo operated on factory grounds, with workers 
formally assigned to cultivate a set amount of land and eventually harvest a planned 
amount of food, other plots were tended by civilians, many of whom accepted Party 
requests or assignments but put in significant free time with this labor. Considering 
that amount of time and energy civilians expended at jobs and daily survival (e. g. 
invested in seeking scarce food and other goods), this was no small effort37.
Note these adaptations were grounded in state control and a hierarchy of 
consumption dictated by the state; by 1942  not only of food but also of bodies in 
statsionary or as dictated by ratsionnoe pitanie. Even if podsobnoe khoziaistvo in-
volved some decentralization, enterprises were still required to fulfill output plans for 
the vegetables they sowed. Alas, none of these innovations came in time to reduce 
the massive death count in the first winter, and podsobnoe khoziaistvo was oriented 
to the next winter. Just as for evacuations and rationing, ratsionnoe pitanie and 
statsionary were introduced far too late to have had the possible impact they could 
have had. Were these more central to food provision earlier in the Blockade — if not 
at the start, when the gravity of the situation was clear to Smolny — then food would 
have been distributed relatively more effectively, in a less haphazard fashion. Fur-
ther, state officials would have had more time to work out initial kinks that inevitably 
come with rapid implementation of new policies. As Stozhilov noted in a retrospective 
report in 1943, food provision was centralized but not well organized38. Partly this 
was because shifts in 1942  gave Lenglavrestoran more duties, canteens, and the 
like to cover, and more personnel meant more room for mistakes or confusion. This 
also meant greater possibilities for theft — more food, coupled with the centralized 
system of the command economy, meant more temptations for insider opportunists 
to steal food for their own consumption or for speculative resale in the rynok system.
Yet cabbage would not magically move from ground to storage to civilians. 
In July 1942, the head of the Leningrad branch of the People’s Commissariat for 
Justice (Narodnyi Komissariat Iustitsii, NKIu), I. A. Rykhlov, suggested to Kuznetsov, 
Kapustin, and Popkov that the city “expropriate” civilians’ vegetables. Leningrad 
NKIu investigators discovered that potatoes, beets, and other produce were turning 
up at the rynok and turning into private profit! Market actors, on interrogation, 
claimed these vegetables would be thrown out or left to rot were they not sold. 
Rykhlov suggested prosecuting civilians who harvested vegetables prematurely for 
their own use, and that Leningraders evacuating the city be forced to turn over their 
produce. Kapustin made a pragmatic objection that took into account civilians’ likely 
responses. A handwritten note on Rykhlov’s text reads: “This proposal is unrealistic, 
as we cannot force an individual to turn over their garden freely at a fixed price. The 
gardener will not agree to surrender at an arbitrary price. Comrade Kapustin agrees 
with the arguments and proposes to leave the question open”39. Leaders of the total-
itarian state were unable or unwilling to combat civilian proprietors: transaction costs 
to expropriate civilian produce were high, and evacuees could spread stories of ex-
propriation where they went, evoking memories of the Civil War and collectivization. 
Some elites were learning lessons, not only about adaptation, but about foreseeing 
consequences of policies.
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Failed Adaptations — the Case of Fish
In the spring, any scholar of the Blockade who happens to be in St. Petersburg 
might observe something that should make him or her take notice. For a few weeks, 
restaurants and pubs offer koriushka, a smelt-like fish that inhabits the Neva and, in 
the spring, makes a run up the river — providing a bounty for pub-crawlers in need 
of good, cheap food. This also happened to be something Smolny and Leningraders 
needed in the Blockade — and this is what makes our hungry scholar of the Blockade 
take notice. Where was that fish, or any Neva fish for that matter, in that first hungry 
winter and thereafter? That same scholar would notice water all around — the Neva, 
the Gulf of Finland, and Lake Ladoga, for starters. Did the war drive away the fish, 
or did Leningraders and their political bosses somehow forget about all that aquatic 
life around them?
The answer is that there were fish in the Neva and surrounding waters, and the 
regime and civilians had not forgotten about them. Individual fishing between 8 p. m. 
and 5  a.  m. was classified as “theft”. Given that fish from Leningrad’s rivers and 
canals might feed soldiers and civilians, this restriction followed a particular logic, 
even if it seems a bit draconian at first glance40. Yet keeping poachers for taking fish 
did not mean the regime had a surefire way to get it, and getting that fish was no 
easy task. Amateur civilian fishermen just would not be able to provide skilled man-
power to complete the job. Harvesting a sufficient quantity of fish required mobilizing 
people and equipment that happened to be in the Baltic Fleet and Red Army. Early in 
the war, the military had commandeered most of the needed equipment for fishing 
and water transportation, and most of the civilians with sufficient skills to catch a 
non-trivial amount of fish were serving in the army and navy. So, in October 1941, 
the Military Council prepared an edict to facilitate fishing. They gave Lenryba and 
several other organizations the right to fish in the Neva, Lakhta-Lisy Nos, the coast 
near Oranienbaum, around Kronshtadt and Seiskar island, and the southeastern part 
of Ladoga. Lenispolkom was required to provide fuel and other necessities for the 
tasks at hand. The naval port commander and the quartermaster of the Leningrad 
Front were required to provide assistance for catching that amount of fish that would 
go to feeding military units. The navy was supposed to give Lenryba permission to 
sail through these waters for fishing purposes. The Leningrad oblast’ ispolkom was 
instructed to release all fishermen in the Pargolovo, Oranienbaum, and Vsevolozhsk 
districts from any work duties not related to fishing and to bring back any fishermen 
who had been evacuated out of the area. The Red Army (specifically, the Eighth 
army) was to return fishing boats to Lenryba and to help transport them to those 
areas for fishing listed above. Lenryba would receive necessary aid from various 
other state organizations and trusts, including Lenglavrestoran, Voentorg, and the 
October and Leningrad railways. Leningrad’s Trade Department would control pro-
duction of food from fish, mostly through the Pishchevik factory. The Military Council 
set a target of 25–30  tons of fish for October and November of 1941 alone, and a 
goal of 2261 tons for the second quarter of 1942 was more ambitious still41.
Just as for pre-war plans to supply Leningrad with food, these decrees ran into 
a different reality. Party instructors from the shipbuilding department of the Gorkom, 
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Sobolev and Grasman, discussed shortcomings of fish policies in a letter to Lazutin 
at the end of November 1941:
Some thoughts on food supplies for the population of Leningrad
Despite the fact that Leningrad lies near a vast water basin, absolutely nothing has been done 
organizing large-scale fishing in the current severe situation of food provision for the population. 
At the same time, central newspapers (Izvestia, Nov. 23., 1941) report about widespread ice 
fishing on the Amur river.
We propose arranging large-scale fishing on the Neva, Lake Ladoga, the Gulf of Finland, 
and some other lakes in the Karelian Isthmus by providing special nets, diving equipment, 
explosives, winches, lifting devices, and if needed even a steam fleet. Those workers who are 
unemployed at factories should be involved in this massive undertaking for catching fish. Naval 
vessels returning from military assignments can also be used as a last resort for catching fish. 
They should be equipped with special devices. At a minimum, the aforementioned measures can 
provide us with 100-150 tons of fish per day.
For a population of 2 million, this would mean an additional ration of 50-60 grams of fish 
per capita that, in turn, would greatly improve the current difficult situation with feeding people 
caused by the untimely blockade of Leningrad…42
There is no any evidence that Lazutin, or the Gorkom, seriously considered 
these options. The only way to implement the aforementioned suggestions was after 
detailed discussions with high-ranking naval officers or at the level of the Military 
Council. However, top brass of the Baltic Fleet were preoccupied with their main task 
of fighting and surviving in extremely unfavorable conditions of besieged Leningrad. 
Given the constant threat of German air raids, ships deployed in the Neva had to be 
covered or disguised and otherwise not attract German attention; all naval maneu-
vers took place only at night. Further, marines were well fed thanks to substantial 
supplies at Kronshtadt, and they had to share some food with the city and the Red 
Army in December 1941 — hence, they had less of an incentive or sense of urgency 
to comply with such time-demanding additional tasks. Alas, what worked well in the 
rear, did not work at all in Leningrad. 
Despite this early planning, by June 1942 only 566 tons of fish had been caught 
for that second quarter of 1942  — less than 25  percent of the amount originally 
hoped for43. One report to Lazutin from late June 1942, “On poaching in the Gulf 
of Finland”, noted difficulties between civilian and military authorities, especially 
regarding fishing in the Primorskii district44. District military commanders were not 
granting civilian authorities permission to let their fisherman go out into the waters. 
Naval authorities guarding the coastline were also doing little about poaching, which 
was also interfering with civilian fishing. Some of these poachers might even have 
been military personnel or civilians working with the military45. Reports on the mili-
tary’s less than helpful attitude to fishing also noted that military commanders were 
less than helpful with collecting firewood for the coming winter. The commander and 
commissar of the vessel Stoikii commandeered firewood from a local factory46, and 
Glavlesosbyt complained to the Military Council that army units were taking wood 
without official permission. Lengransitsplav similarly complained that soldiers were 
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taking wood allotted for constructing defensive fortifications without formal permis-
sion, which constituted theft47. Military policies and politics, it turned out, erected an 
unfortunate barrier to harvesting this particular bounty. Even though the military was 
under civilian control, military authorities in this case felt confident enough to call 
their own shots, in the end depriving Leningraders (and many fellow soldiers) of fish. 
Catching fish was not too much a new policy, given that the state collected fish 
earlier, and using fish to feed the population should not have been a radically new 
idea. However, here we see a counter-case to our earlier discussions: the attempt 
to use a readily available source of food was stymied by organizational interests, not 
just institutional contradictions. This was a potentially problematic civilian-military 
divide, the likes of which has not received sufficient attention for the Blockade or the 
entire Soviet war effort. And the civilian-military divide was not simply at the level of 
elites; it could have been at work at lower levels, such as military units taking what 
they could (even if marginal) and daring civilian authorities to do anything about 
it. One wonders what more wrinkles and contradictions in the political economy of 
wartime survival were embedded in problematic civilian-military relations and military 
capacities to enforce their will.
Conclusion
This has been a small part of one half of the political economy of wartime 
survival in the Blockade Leningrad. Much remains to tell: state-civilian interactions 
(through letters, resistance of bodies, and the like); politics of production under 
duress and starvation; the real degree of state capacity, given corruption, incom-
petence, and uncertainty in a rapidly changing military situation; and other aspects 
of the institutional order. The other half is civilian responses to duress and effects 
of their innovations on institutional capacity and possible policies. We have hinted 
at some of these, although a more developed study of shadow exchange inside the 
state and via the rynok system is underway. In sum, the story of persistence versus 
adaptation, and contingency versus capacity, remains to be told. This has been only 
an initial step in that broader project.
Our goal here has been to examine some policy innovations  — their roots, 
scale, and trajectories — by the time it was clear that the Blockade was not a quick 
aberration and that civilian death and suffering had to be addressed before either 
civilians died off in even greater numbers, or took matters into their own hands. Yet 
innovations had limits, especially Stalin’s personal dictatorship, but also a political 
culture of Bolshevism in which power and control were perhaps the most important 
facets. Innovation might entail either devolution of some authority and action, or 
lead to outcomes that could create yet more cracks in Soviet power. The trick was 
walking the fine line between devolution of decision-making that would allow low-
er-level cadres with local knowledge to take action, while not losing too much of a 
grip on power. Many innovations addressed this by building on previous templates. 
Wartime podsobnoe khoziaistvo was an expansion on the same pre-war policies, 
albeit on a greater scale and with greater civilian participation — which, as we saw, 
mean acknowledging de facto civilian “ownership” (of some kind) in the fruits of that 
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labor. ORS built upon existing institutions, as did ratsionnoe pitanie. These basic 
innovations did not challenge the Bolshevik hierarchy of authority. The case of fish, 
however, reveals a problematic new hindrance to innovation: not from Bolshevik 
mentalities or convoluted economic institutions, but from possible competition with 
military interests and capacity. 
The second half of 1941 was a story of shock, panic, and desperation. By 1942, 
the war and Blockade were a new normal, and the regime responded accordingly: 
devising responses that were more in line with that new normality, that did not overtly 
challenging existing institutional arrangements and power logics, and that could de-
fend state power to control its citizens. However, other challenges persisted (which 
we address in forthcoming work): a growing economy of shadow exchange (some of 
which involved theft and speculation), tensions in control and autonomy of Blockade 
bodies, and a tension between formal discourse (especially propaganda) and civilian 
discourse (from letters to the authorities, to shadow talk) revealing potential contra-
dictions and correlations between the political economy of control and a nascent 
moral economy of dignity and provision. Ratsionnoe pitanie, podsobnoe klhoziaistvo, 
statsionry, and the like were the easy parts of innovation, and they revealed that 
the regime could adapt — when power was not so much at stake. What happened 
beyond that is another story to be told.
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